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Abstract 
We investigate whether banks use commission and fee income to manage reported earnings as an 
income-increasing or income smoothing strategy. We find that banks use commission and fee income 
for income smoothing purposes and this behaviour persist during recessionary periods and in 
environments with stronger investor protection. The implication of the findings is that bank non-interest 
income which achieves diversification gains to banks is also used to manipulate reported earnings. Our 
findings show that real earnings management is prevalent among banks in Africa. Further research into 
earnings management should examine real earnings management among non-financial firms in 
developing regions. From an accounting standard setting perspective, our evidence suggests the need 
for national/international standard setters to adopt strict revenue recognition rules that ensure that banks 
or firms report the actual fees they make, and to discourage banks from delaying (or deferring) the 
collection of fee income to manage or smooth reported earnings opportunistically. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine whether banks use commission and fee income to manage earnings, the incentive to do so, 
and the influence of institutional and economic factors on this behaviour. We focus on bank commission 
and fee income because commission and fee income is considered to be a significant component of 
bank non-interest revenue (Smith et al, 2003; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Ozili, 2017a). In recent years, 
the low interest rate environment is claimed to have led to a decline in bank interest income and has 
encouraged banks to rely more on non-interest source of funds to remain profitable (DeYoung & Rice, 
2004). Although there are strong arguments for banks’ reliance on non-interest income, non-interest 
income is also known to be unstable compared to interest income.1 The unstable nature of banks’ non-
interest income can motivate managers to exert some discretion or control on the level of reported non-
interest income, and in theory, the variability of income is predicted to create opportunities for managers 
to smooth reported earnings to achieve some desired profit levels (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988). 
However, the extent of this behaviour can be influenced by institutional quality (Leuz et al, 2003), and 
by differing economic conditions (Ozili and Thankom, 2018). Therefore, it is important to understand 
how variation in the non-interest income component of earnings can affect bank financial reporting. 
Given that commission and fee income is a significant component of non-interest income (Smith et al, 
2003; DeYoung and Rice, 2004), we argue that bank managers have incentives to influence the 
reporting of commission and fee income in an attempt to increase earnings or to smooth out abnormal 
fluctuations in earnings. Managers can delay the recognition of commission and fee income to a future 
period or increase commission and fee income in the current period to increase earnings to meet some 
desired reporting earnings outcomes. We test this prediction using bank data from a region where there 
is no uniform regulation or uniform reporting for commission and fee income. 
Except for banks in Europe where there is some attempt to regulate and standardise some component 
of commission and fee income, there is yet no uniform regulation or reporting for commission and fee 
income among banks in Africa. The lack of standardisation in the accounting for bank revenue 
recognition among African countries can create opportunities for bank managers in the region to 
influence the reporting of commission and fee income to manage reported earnings. The absence of 
non-uniform accounting rules for revenue recognition in the region suggests that managerial discretion 
will be a significant determinant of revenue recognition for banks in the region; this, therefore, provides 
a natural setting to investigate managerial discretion in revenue recognition for earnings management. 
In addition to the reasons above, this study is also motivated by the little focus on bank real activities-
based earnings management compared to the extensive literature on bank accrual earnings management 
via loan loss provisions2.  
Since we are using dataset from Africa, our study also responds, and provides some insight, to other 
issues or questions such as: Do banks in Africa engage in real activities management? What are the 
incentives for real activities-based earnings management among banks in the African region? Under 
what circumstances do real activities-based earnings management occur among banks in Africa? To 
provide some answers to these questions, our study investigates whether bank revenues (in this case, 
commission and fee income) are manipulated to influence the level of reported earnings particularly in 
an under-researched African region. To date, we are not aware of any study that has examined this 
question/topic in the context of banks in developed countries. In a developed country context, Stubben 
(2010) show that firms have incentives to manipulate their revenue to manage earnings but his analysis 
                                                          
1
 By ‘unstable’, we mean that clients/customers can quickly change banks to patronise the service of another 
bank, which leads to unstable commission and fee during such periods (Smith et al, 2003). 
2
 E.g. Ahmed et al. (1999) and Fonseca & Gonzalez (2008) 
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did not examine banks. In contrast, we examine revenue-based earnings management among banks, and 
the banking literature has not considered bank revenue to be a possible earnings management tool. 
One common approach used to test for earnings management among banks is to focus on one 
component of earnings and its relation to earnings before that component while controlling for factors 
that influence that component of earnings (see, McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Ahmed et al., 1999; 
McNichols, 2001; Ozili and Thankom, 2018). This is the approach we adopt in this paper. This approach 
is considered to provide a more precise estimate of managerial discretion in bank financial reporting 
(McNichols, 2001). Accordingly, we model commission and fee income as a function of earnings before 
commission and fee income while controlling for economic fluctuation, bank size, investor protection 
and other factors. Similar to Ahmed et al. (1999) and Stubben (2010), we model bank commission and 
fee income as a function of its discretionary components (i.e., earnings before commission and fee 
income) and its proposed non-discretionary components (i.e., the commission and fee income growth 
rate, bank size and macroeconomic fluctuation). 
Overall, the result indicates that African banks use commission and fee income to smooth earnings and 
this behaviour is more pronounced when they are in recessionary periods and in environments with 
stronger investor protection. One implication of our findings is that African banks also use real 
activities-based techniques to influence the level of earnings not just accruals. Our findings show that 
this behaviour is common across banks in most African countries. Our analysis in this paper is useful 
to accounting standard setters and bank regulators in the region who want to understand (i) the extent 
to which bank managers exercise discretion in earnings, (ii) how they do it, and (iii) the impact of this 
behaviour on earnings quality.  
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. Our study contributes to the positive accounting 
theory (PAT) literature which examines the accounting and non-accounting decisions that influence 
managers’ choice of accounting methods in financial reporting (Watts and Zimmermann, 1986). We 
show that the need to survive a recession, and the presence of strong investor protection are two non-
accounting decisions that influence bank managers’ choice to engage in real earning management. 
Secondly, we provide evidence that banks in Africa use commission and fees to manage (or to smooth) 
earnings, a finding which has not been clearly explored in prior literature. Thirdly, by examining 
commission and fee income, the study contributes to the literature on the relation between non-interest 
income and bank diversification by providing additional insight that non-interest income that achieves 
diversification gains is also used to manipulate (or smooth) reported earnings. 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents the theory and literature. 
Section 3 presents the research design, data and method. Section 4 reports the empirical results of the 
analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
2.1. Theory 
Several hypotheses provide alternative explanations for why firms manage reported earnings. For 
instance, the positive accounting theory (PAT)’s bonus plan hypothesis predict that managers of firms 
will use accounting techniques or accounting numbers to increase earnings in order to increase the 
likelihood of receiving bonuses that depend on the earnings number; while the PAT’s political cost 
hypothesis predict that firms will use accounting techniques that lower the size of current earnings if 
reported earnings are expected to be too high in order to avoid regulatory scrutiny and political scrutiny 
P.K. Ozili & E.R. Outa 
Page 4 of 21 
 
of bank earnings by industry regulators (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Overall, positive accounting 
theory argue that the incentive to manage earnings is driven by the presence of explicit contracts (i.e., 
bonus plans, debt covenant violation and the firm’s sensitivity to regulatory/political scrutiny).  
On the other hand, the income smoothing hypothesis predicts that firms will use accounting procedures 
or accounting numbers to lower high earnings or to increase low earnings to smooth out the fluctuations 
in earnings (Ahmed et al., 1999; Ozili and Thankom, 2018). Also, the information asymmetry 
hypothesis suggests that geographically-diversified firms with complex structures have greater 
information asymmetry, and managers in such firms may exploit the additional information asymmetry 
to manage earnings (Amidu and Kuibo, 2015). Taken together, these hypotheses provide alternative 
theoretical explanations for earnings management practices among firms. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1. Real Earnings Management 
Zang (2011) show that earnings management can occur through two channels: accruals earnings 
management (AEM) and real activities-based earnings management (REM). Many studies focus on 
earnings management using discretionary accruals (e.g. Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Bens et al., 2002; 
Kothari, 2001; Ozili and Outa, 2018) while very few studies investigate banks because of the additional 
regulations, disclosure requirements and the difficulties to determine actual accruals in banks. 
Regarding earnings management using real techniques, Roychowdhury (2006) define real earnings 
management as departures from normal operational practices motivated by managers’ desire to mislead 
some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course 
of operations.  
Regarding banks, the literature on real activities-based earnings management among banks is rather 
scant, and Barth et al. (2017) confirm this. For instance, Beatty et al. (2002) find evidence that publicly 
traded US banks use real techniques e.g. realised securities gains and losses, as well as loan loss 
provisions, to eliminate small decreases in earnings. Also, Barth et al (2017) find evidence that banks 
use realised gains and losses on available-for-sale securities to smooth earnings. Among developing 
country studies, Hamdi and Zarai (2012) show that Islamic banks manage losses to avoid reporting 
losses and to avoid earning decreases. Ozili (2017b) investigate the use of accruals (loan loss provisions) 
to smooth income by African banks, and observe that African banks, particularly listed banks, use 
accruals to smooth income. Additionally, Ozili (2017b) find that accruals are procyclical with economic 
fluctuations. Amidu and Kuipo (2015) examine 330 African banks from 29 African countries from 2002 
to 2009 and find that more than two-thirds of the 29 countries use discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings. Similarly, Ozili (2015) show that banks in Nigeria use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings 
over time. These studies do not focus on bank real earnings management via commission and fee 
income. 
Studies that test for the presence of earnings management among firms commonly use the total accrual 
approach that estimate non-discretionary accruals as a linear function of change in revenues (or cash 
revenue), change in gross property, plant, and equipment; and the residual is taken as the measure of 
discretionary accruals or managerial discretion (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). This approach has 
been criticised for two reasons. One, it provides noisy and biased estimates of managed earnings 
(Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Thomas and Zhang, 2000). Two, the approach do not reveal information 
about the component of earnings that is used to manage earnings (Beneish, 2001; McNichols, 2001). In 
contrast, banking studies commonly follow the approach of McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Ahmed 
et al (1999) that examine one component of earnings and its relation to earnings before the component 
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while controlling for factors that influence that component of earnings. We follow this approach in this 
paper to investigate whether a significant component of bank revenue is used to manage earnings. 
Because revenues are a positive function of firm earnings, Plummer & Mest (2001), Caylor (2010) and 
Stubben (2010) have associated revenue-based earnings management with income-increasing earnings 
management, but these studies did not examine banks.  
2.2.2. Bank Commission and Fee Income 
Commission and fee income is the largest component of bank non-interest income and the second main 
source of revenue to banks (Smith et al., 2003; DeYoung & Rice, 2004). To date, the banking literature 
focus on how non-interest income/revenue relate to (i) bank diversification benefits (Smith et al., 2003), 
and (ii) increase in overall profitability of banks; with little or no attention to whether bank managers 
have incentives to influence or delay the recognition of income from fee-based activities to influence 
the level of reported earnings. For instance, DeYoung & Rice (2004) suggest that banks engage in non-
interest activities to generate non-interest income to boost shortfalls in overall profitability while Stiroh 
(2004) and Stiroh & Rumble (2006) argue that banks engage in non-interest activities to generate non-
interest income to diversify bank income stream. DeYoung & Roland (2001) show that while income 
from fee-based activities increased bank earnings, it also increased the volatility of earnings thus 
signalling little or no diversification gains. Overall, there is yet no consensus on whether bank non-
interest income achieves its intended diversification benefits. Taken together, prior literature do not 
explicitly view bank commission and fee income as a possible earnings management tool for banks, 
and whether the presence of institutions that constrain managerial behaviour discourages earnings 
management behaviour, if present. Our study explicitly examines this topic, by isolating commission 
and fee income component of bank non-interest revenue to examine how bank managers’ reporting for 
commission and fee income relate to bank earnings. 
2.2.3. Economic Conditions 
Some studies show that banks have incentive to use financial/accounting numbers to increase or lower 
earnings during upturns and downturns in the economy (e.g. Ozili and Outa, 2017; El Sood, 2012; 
Beatty & Liao, 2009; Liu & Ryan, 2006). These studies document that banks use discretionary accruals 
to increase earnings during a recession to avoid reporting losses during the period. For instance, El Sood 
(2012) find that US banks use accruals to increase earnings to avoid reporting a loss during a recession 
(i.e., the 2007-2009 financial crisis period) while Beatty and Liao (2009) find similar evidence for US 
banks. Liu & Ryan (2006), on the other hand, find that banks smooth income to reduce high profits 
during economic boom. Ozili and Outa (2017) in their survey of literature, demonstrate that the earnings 
distribution of banks is directly linked to economic fluctuations - high profits during good times and 
low profits during bad times. We complement these studies and investigate whether banks use 
commission and fee income to manage/smooth earnings during upturns and downturns in the economy. 
 
3.  Research Design  
3.1. Contextual Framework 
Banking systems in African countries vary largely in terms of the level of financial development, 
banking concentration, financial deepening, regulation and supervision, corporate governance, investor 
protection, banking population, bank transparency, etc. Beck & Cull (2013) points out that banking 
systems in Africa are relatively more volatile compared to developed countries. They posit that the 
frequent fluctuations in the income stream of firms and households in the region sometimes make it 
P.K. Ozili & E.R. Outa 
Page 6 of 21 
 
difficult for individuals and firms to repay loans as at when due; hence, contributing to income 
instability which can translate to banking system instability in the region. We argue that this claimed 
banking instability in the African region can create incentives for banks in the region to use earnings 
management techniques to stabilise reported earnings over time when they are in fluctuating banking 
environments.  
Regarding institutions, an African context to the study of bank real earnings management practices is 
important because institutions that constrain bank behaviour across African countries significantly 
differ from institutions that constrain bank earnings management behaviour in Europe or the US due to 
differences in the level of development, extent of enforcement and so on. Also, the growing need for 
African countries to establish institutions that promote increased bank transparency, protection of the 
rights of minority shareholder and greater director liability, makes this study relevant. Hence, the need 
to understand how real activities-based earnings management is influenced by institutional quality. 
3.2 Data 
We base our sample on African banking institutions in Bankscope database which contains accounting 
information for large number of banks in the region. The sample consists of banks from 18 African 
countries during the 2004 to 2013 period. The sample period selected, allows us to focus on the events 
occurring within the specified pre-and post-crisis event window, where no significant regional change 
in accounting rules had taken place at the time (2004 to 2013)3. The countries in the sample include: 
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Togo, Tanzania, Ghana, Morocco, Uganda, Tunisia, Senegal and Zambia.  
We use three country-level variables: real gross domestic product growth rate, banking competition and 
investor protection. Bankscope database also provides cross-country data for banking competition 
(Lerner index) archived in World Bank databank database. We obtain our real gross domestic growth 
rate variable from the World Economic forum (see appendix for overview of data sources used for our 
empirical analysis). We exclude countries that do not have institutional data relevant to the study. All 
banks that report data for commission and fee income for at least 3 years and have the relevant country-
level data are included in the analysis. Regarding bank type, we did not make a distinction between 
types of African banks.  
To clean up the data, we eliminated outliers above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile, to 
minimise outliers and measurement errors. Secondly, we did not eliminate 2008 bank-year observations 
to control for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis because we did not have a reason to believe that 
the balance sheet of African banks was ‘adversely’ affected by the 2008 crisis. The resulting sample 
comprise of 271 banks. Also, because some banks have missing values, the data is an unbalanced panel. 
A first look at the sample descriptive statistics in Table 1a reveal that commission and fee income (CF) 
for most African countries is around or above the mean CF while CF is much lower for banks in 
Mauritius, Morocco and Tunisia. Also, the negative values reported for EBCF for some African 
countries indicate that CF is a significant portion of bank earnings, if excluded, would lead to negative 
earnings or losses. Finally, the number of observations is large in most columns in Table 1, but the 
observations in each column are rather unbalanced across all columns due to missing values for some 
variables which are not reported in Bankscope database.  
                                                          
3
 Also, the number of available bank years used for this study is 10 years (i.e., 2004 to 2013). A ten-year period 
is sufficient for the study because a 10-year is generally considered to reflect a full economic cycle which can 
capture both upswings and downturns in an economy 
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Insert Table 1a Here 
3.3 Research Design 
To test whether African banks use commission and fee income to manage or smooth income, we use a 
variation of the models use by prior studies (e.g., Ahmed et al., 1999; Barth et al., 2017; Ozili and 
Thakom, 2018), which examine the relation between some bank accounting number and earnings before 
the accounting number while controlling for other factors that might influence the magnitude of the 
accounting number. Our main modified multivariate regression model is given as: 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝛼6𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1) 
All variables are defined in table 5. CF is the dependent variable measured as net commission and fee 
income deflated by bank total asset. The CF variable captures reported commission and fee income 
decisions of bank managers that are specific to the bank. EBCF is the earnings management variable of 
interest, measured as earnings before tax and net commission and fee income. Barth et al. (2017) 
intuitively show that, if firms use a revenue item to increase earnings, a positive relation between the 
revenue item and reported earnings is expected while a negative sign is expected if banks use a revenue 
item to smooth earnings which can be achieved by reporting fewer revenue items in order to decrease 
too high earnings. Accordingly, we predict a positive sign for the EBCF coefficient if African banks 
use commission and fee income to increase earnings as an income-increasing strategy and we predict a 
negative sign for the EBCF coefficient if African banks use commission and fee income to smooth 
reported earnings.  
Additionally, we test whether African banks use CF to manage/smooth earnings when they expect 
losses or when they are more profitable. To test for this, two dummy variables are introduced: NEG that 
take the value 1 if EBCF is negative and zero otherwise; and POS that take the value 1 if EBCF is 
above-the-median EBCF and zero otherwise. The POS and NEG variables are then interacted with 
EBCF. POS*EBCF test whether banks have incentive to use CF to manage/smooth earnings when they 
are more profitable (i.e., above-median EBCF). NEG*EBCF test whether banks have incentive to use 
CF to manage/smooth earnings when they expect losses. The expanded model is shown below: 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼5𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝑃𝑂𝑆∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼7𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑁𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2) 
For the control variables, ΔCFR captures contemporaneous change in the absolute amount of bank net 
commission and fee income. This variable controls for the impact of contemporaneous fluctuation in 
commission and fee income that may influence bank managers’ decision on the amount of commission 
and fee income to be reported in the current period. ΔCFR is change in the absolute value of net 
commission and fee income given as [(CFRt – CFRt-1)/CFRt-1]. When banks expect unstable 
commission and fee income in the next period, they will have incentives to report more fee income in 
the current period to compensate for subsequent periods that will yield lower commission and fee 
income. Hence, we predict a positive relation between CF and ΔCFR.  
The SIZE variable is included to control for the effect of bank size on commission and fee income. 
Anandarajan et al (2003) suggest that large banks are considered to have high level of business activities 
and a large client base for which they charge fees and commission in exchange for the services offered. 
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Following this reasoning, we expect banks with high level of business activities to generate more 
commission and fee income; that is, large banks should have more fee income, therefore, we expect a 
positive sign for the SIZE coefficient. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets.  
Real gross domestic product growth rate, (ΔGDP), controls for the impact of economic cycle fluctuation 
on bank commission and fee income. Because bank clients will be able to pay for the services offered 
to them during good economic conditions compared to periods of economic downturns, bank 
commission and fee income is expected to be relatively substantial during periods of economic 
prosperity and lower during economic downturns. Hence, we predict a positive sign for ΔGDP 
coefficient.  
As an additional test, we check whether banks use commission and fee income to manage earnings 
when they are going through periods of economic recession or prosperity. To capture this, we introduce 
two dummy variables into the analysis: REC that take the value 1 when ΔGDP is negative and zero 
otherwise, and BOOM that take the value 1 when ΔGDP is above-the-median ΔGDP and zero 
otherwise. REC and BOOM variables are then interacted with EBCF to test whether the relation 
between earnings and commission and fee income depend on transient states of the economy. 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼5𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝑅𝐸𝐶∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼8𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑀 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡. (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 3) 
Our country-level variables control for the influence of cross-country investor protection and 
competition that might influence the reporting of bank commission and fee income. Fonseca & 
Gonzalez (2008) and Ozili (2018a) argue and show evidence that strong investor protection and legal 
enforcement discourages bank income smoothing behaviour via discretionary accruals. Similarly, we 
use ‘INVPRO’ and ‘LEGAL’ to control for protection of minority shareholder rights and the quality of 
legal system across African countries, respectively. Higher values of the two variables indicate stronger 
protection of minority shareholders rights and higher legal enforcement quality. We also use the Lerner 
index to control for banking competitiveness across countries. Beck et al (2013) also used the Lerner 
index to control for cross-country banking competition. Banks in highly competitive banking 
environments may charge lower fees for services offered to clients in order to attract new clients and/or 
to retain existing clients. Therefore, we expect a negative relation between CF and the Lerner index 
variable. Finally, we include the error term. The expanded equation is given as: 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼5𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝑅𝐸𝐶∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼8𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑀 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿 +  𝛼10𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹 +  𝛼11𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂 +  𝛼12𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹 +  𝛼13𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 +  𝛼14𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡. (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 4) 
To test the robustness of the main econometric results, we first run the fixed effects4 OLS estimation to 
account for bank and period unobserved heterogeneity between banks and across periods. Also, by 
controlling for bank fixed effect, the fixed effect estimation addresses omitted variables bias that may 
be associated with the main model in Equation 1. Also, since our explanatory variables and institutional 
variables are time-varying, we also find it more appropriate to use the fixed effect estimation rather than 
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pooled OLS. The Hausman test also show that fixed effect estimation is a more appropriate estimation 
technique. However, we later use pooled OLS estimation when we introduce two time-invariant 
variables. 
Finally, we test whether the use of CF to manage/smooth bank earnings exhibit forward-looking 
properties. Bushman & William (2012) use this approach and find that managers exploit their discretion 
in forward-looking reporting of discretionary accruals to manage earnings. To test for forward-looking 
behaviour, we take the lag (or beginning values) of the explanatory variables in Equation 1 except for 
EBCF and ΔGDP variables. This approach ensure that the CF coefficient only picks up the extent to 
which banks’ reporting of commission and fee income is influenced solely by earnings consideration 
and macroeconomic considerations without reference to current information about bank non-interest 
income determinants. This lagged approach also allow us to test for the persistence of commission and 
fee income over time. The model we adopt for this analysis is similar to Bushman & William (2012), 
and is given as: 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  𝛼1𝐸𝐵𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  𝛼3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 1 +  𝛼4𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡               (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 5) 
We estimate the model in Equation 5 by using Arellano & Bond (1991) Generalised-Method-of-
Moments (GMM) first difference estimator. This technique address (i) the presence of unobserved 
bank-specific effects, which is eliminated by taking first-differences of all variables; (2) the 
autoregressive process in the data regarding the persistence of bank commission and fee income and 
the (iii) potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables with the error term. 
 
4. Result 
4.1. Main Result 
The main result is reported in Column 1 of Table 2. The EBCF coefficient is negative and significant 
at 1% level and indicates that banks in the African region use commission and fee income to smooth 
earnings. This is consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis and is consistent with Barth et al 
(2017) who find that banks use real techniques to smooth income. The result implies that African banks 
report fewer commission and fee income to lower high earnings and report higher commission and fee 
income to increase low earnings so that reported earnings are never too high or too low, to achieve 
income smoothing. Ozili (2015) also find evidence for income smoothing among Nigerian banks, and 
Ozili and Thankom (2018) find evidence for income smoothing among European systemic banks. 
The control variables report the predicted signs except for SIZE. ΔCFR report the expected positive 
sign but is insignificant while SIZE coefficient is negatively significant, indicating that large banks 
report fewer commission and fee income. ΔGDP coefficient reports the predicted positive sign but is 
insignificant, implying that reported commission and fee income by African banks do not exhibit 
significant cyclical behaviour in response to changing economic conditions in the African region. 
4.2. Additional Analysis: Transient Effect 
Column 2 and 3 of Table 2 show that the POS*EBCF and NEG*EBCF coefficients are insignificant. 
Column 4 report a negative sign for REC*EBCF coefficient and is significant at 5% level, indicating 
that the use of commission and fee income to smooth income by African banks is more pronounced 
during economic downturns/recessions. Beatty & Liao (2009) and El Sood (2012) document similar 
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evidence for accruals. BOOM*EBCF, on the other hand, report a negative but insignificant sign and is 
inconsistent with Liu & Ryan (2006). 
Regarding investor protection and banking competition, INVPRO*EBCF coefficient report a negative 
sign and is significant at 1% level. This indicates that bank income smoothing via commission and fee 
income is more pronounced in environments that have stronger protection of minority shareholders 
rights. LEGAL*EBCF is negatively significant at the 5% level, indicating that bank income smoothing 
via commission and fee income is also pronounced in environments with higher legal enforcement 
quality. Taken together, these findings indicate that African bank managers are more likely to use real 
techniques to smooth bank earnings when they are in strong legal and investor protection environments. 
Also, LERNER*EBCF coefficient report a positive but insignificant sign. Overall, the results indicate 
that African banks use commission and fee income to smooth earnings and this behaviour is more 
pronounced when they are in recessionary periods and in environments with stronger investor 
protection.  
Insert Table 2 Here 
4.3. Cross-Country Analysis 
Next, we undertake country-specific analysis to control for the bias that international analysis ignores 
national aspects that differ by country. We re-run the model for each country and include real GDP 
growth rate but exclude the institutional variables from the model. EBCF and ΔGDP are the variables 
of interest here. Table 3 report the results. As can be observed, EBCF coefficient reports a negative sign 
for 14 countries (Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia). Of these, EBCF coefficient is negatively 
significant for banks in 8 African countries (Algeria, Cameroun, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa and Tanzania), indicating evidence for earnings smoothing via commission and fee 
income. Also, EBCF coefficient is positively significant for banks in Mauritius, indicating evidence for 
income-increasing earnings management. ΔGDP coefficient is negatively significant in Zambia, Togo 
and Morocco, indicating a counter-cyclical relation between CF and economic cycle fluctuations. Also, 
procyclical commission and fee income behaviour is observed in Cameroun and Ethiopia as indicated 
by the positively significant ΔGDP coefficient. Overall, the result suggests that earnings smoothing is 
common among countries in our sample. Also, the link between commission and fee income and the 
economic cycle across countries in the sample is mostly weak (insignificant). This weak link provides 
some justification for banks’ involvement in non-interest activities as income generated from such 
activities are not significantly correlated with business cycle fluctuations. 
Insert Table 3 Here 
4.4. Pre- and Post-Financial Crisis 
Next, we test whether earnings management is pronounced in the post-financial crisis period relative to 
the pre-financial crisis period. To do this, we create a financial crisis dummy variable (CRISIS) and 
assign a value ‘1’ for the post-crisis period (2009-2013) and assign a value of ‘0’ for the pre-financial 
crisis period (2004-2007)5; thereafter, we interact the financial crisis variable with the earnings 
                                                          
5
 The year-2008 data is excluded from the analysis. This is because most banks had significant write-offs in the 
crisis-years and including such crisis-data into the models often constitute outliers which can bias the empirical 
results due to the extreme or large values for some variables. Furthermore, African banks experienced 
significant write-offs during the crisis-years due to their heavy exposure to fluctuating oil prices in 2008. The 
financial crisis made oil prices volatile and transmitted huge losses on the balance sheet of African banks that 
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management variable (EBCF). The result is reported in Column 3 of Table 4. The EBCF coefficient is 
significant but the interaction of EBCF with CRISIS is insignificant, indicating that there is no evidence 
for bank earnings management via commission and fee income in the post-crisis period. More so, the 
CRISIS variable is not statistically significant, indicating that the post-crisis period did not have a 
significant effect on bank earning management using commission and fee income in Africa, after the 
financial crisis.  
Insert Column 3 of Table 4 Here 
4.5. Robustness 
First, the correlation matrix in the appendix show that the correlation among the variables is sufficiently 
low and suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis. Second, we re-estimate the models 
using the natural logarithm of real GDP growth rate as an alternative measure to capture non-negative 
fluctuations in the economic cycle instead of real GDP growth rate. Taking the natural log drops out 
the negative values. We then interact the new measure with EBCF and re-run the model and the results 
remain insignificant. We also modify the BOOM variable to take the value 1 for all positive values of 
real GDP growth rate while negative values take zero. The result is not significantly affected by this 
change. Hence, we did not report these analyses due to lack of space in the manuscript. Further, 
regarding the high earnings dummy variable ‘POS’, we use an alternative measure where the POS 
dummy variable take the value 1 when EBCF is positive and zero otherwise. The result was not 
significantly affected by this change.  
Third, with respect to the sample size, we used (i) active banks in the region, and (ii) use all banks that 
have data for three consecutive years in any order in the time series. The latter allows us to include 
active banks that do not have full reporting data on commission and fee income, therefore, we are 
confident that survivorship bias is not an issue in the analysis. Fourth, we test whether the use of CF to 
smooth earnings is achieved when banks do not consider current information about the structure of 
commission and fee income. The result is derived from the model in Equation 5. Column 1 and 2 of 
Table 4 show that the CF coefficient is negative but not significant indicating that bank managers do 
not use CF to smooth earnings when they do not take into account current information about non-interest 
income or commission and fee income (or non-interest income structure). The observed negative sign 
further confirms the main result that bank managers use CF to smooth earnings. Also, CFt-1 is positively 
significant in Column 1 and 2, indicating that previous information about commission and fee income 
is a major determinant of reported commission and fee income in the current period. Also, we check 
whether listed and unlisted African banks use CF to smooth or manage earnings and the results are not 
significant.  
Finally, we address concerns that the large number of sample banks for South Africa may affect our 
inference. We excluded South African banks from the sample and the results do not change significantly 
as can be observed in Column 7 of Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                          
had significant exposure in the oil sector. Much of the losses were written-off in their year-2008 financial 
statement, hence the need to exclude 2008 year-observations. 
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Earnings management among banks in emerging and developing countries is an emerging area in the 
literature and has received considerable attention among researchers, regulators and analysts in the 
banking sector. This study re-examines the question on earnings management focusing on the African 
banking sector. We focus on how banks use commission and fee income to influence reported earnings. 
Using African bank data, over a 10-year period 2004 to 2013, the result and conclusions indicate that 
African banks use commission and fee income to smooth reported earnings and this behaviour is more 
pronounced when they are in recessionary periods and in environments with stronger investor 
protection.  
From a prudential perspective, research on bank commission and fee income is important to banking 
supervisors who have concerns that banks in the region charge high fees to clients but disguise this 
behaviour by understating earnings to avoid reporting too high earnings possibly to evade scrutiny of 
bank profits. Hence, our evidence shed some light into this issue and underline the need for sound 
prudential guidelines to supervise and monitor the reporting of commission and fee income and other 
revenue items by African banks. From an accounting standard setting perspective, our findings stress 
the need for national/international standard setters to adopt strict revenue recognition rules that ensure 
that banks/firms report the actual fees they make, and to discourage banks from delaying (or deferring) 
the collection of fee income to manage or smooth reported earnings opportunistically.  
One limitation of the study is that recent developments in African countries could alter the results, 
particularly in the post 2014 era. Another limitation is that the years after 2008 could also be affected 
by the crisis. Therefore, future research should explore the potential for revenue management as an 
earnings management strategy in the post-crisis period. 
A natural direction for future research is the need for future studies to undertake an in-depth analysis of 
specific factors, including accounting and regulatory practices in individual countries, that influence 
this behaviour in the region. Future research can replicate this study to developed country contexts 
where the reporting of revenue is not regulated or standardised. Finally, future research could also 
investigate whether Basel capital regulation have any influence on banks reported commission and fee 
income. For instance, banks with more regulatory capital can have incentives to engage in risky 
activities for which they can charge higher fees and commission. 
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Tables  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Number of Observations per country) 
The final number of observations for each country are reported in parenthesis (below the mean values) 
Country Mean 
CF 
Mean 
ΔCFR 
Mean 
EBCF 
Mean 
SIZE 
Mean 
ΔGDP 
Mean 
LERNER 
Mean 
INVPRO 
Mean 
LEGAL 
# 
Banks 
Algeria 0.017 
(132) 
1.39 
(115) 
0.004 
(132) 
14.32 
(142) 
3.1 
(150) 
0.57 
(120) 
5 
(135) 
-0.71 
(120) 
15 
Angola 0.015 
(99) 
2.49 
(86) 
0.008 
(99) 
13.88 
(102) 
10.8 
(130) 
0.43 
(104) 
5.3 
(117) 
-1.34 
(104) 
13 
Botswana 0.015 
(99) 
0.31 
(84) 
0.034 
(99) 
12.90 
(102) 
7.6 
(120) 
0.206 
(84) 
5.4 
(108) 
0.63 
(96) 
12 
Cameroun 0.025 
(36) 
-0.04 
(33) 
-0.006 
(39) 
13.09 
(54) 
3.5 
(60) 
0.388 
(48) 
4.3 
(54) 
-1.12 
(54) 
6 
Egypt 0.013 
(345) 
0.087 
(304) 
0.001 
(345) 
14.83 
(345) 
4.6 
(360) 
0.135 
(240) 
3.6 
(324) 
-0.12 
(288) 
16 
Ethiopia 0.014 
(82) 
1.33 
(72) 
0.018 
(82) 
13.28 
(82) 
11.0 
(100) 
0.537 
(80) 
3.3 
(90) 
-0.72 
(80) 
10 
Ghana 0.027 
(109) 
0.20 
(94) 
0.009 
(109) 
13.11 
(109) 
7.5 
(150) 
0.348 
(120) 
6.3 
(135) 
-0.07 
(120) 
15 
Kenya 0.018 
(234) 
0.189 
(209) 
0.007 
(234) 
12.47 
(237) 
5.3 
(240) 
0.318 
(192) 
5 
(216) 
-0.96 
(192) 
24 
Mauritius 0.006 
(121) 
0.153 
(106) 
0.009 
(121) 
13.68 
(124) 
3.9 
(140) 
0.475 
(112) 
7.7 
(126) 
0.91 
(112) 
14 
Morocco 0.007 
(99) 
0.116 
(86) 
0.015 
(99) 
16.01 
(104) 
4.4 
(130) 
0.293 
(104) 
3.4 
(117) 
-0.18 
(104) 
13 
Nigeria 0.023 
(59) 
0.153 
(43) 
0.185 
(59) 
15.73 
(63) 
8.8 
(160) 
0.185 
(128) 
5.7 
(144) 
-1.22 
(128) 
16 
Senegal 0.015 
(80) 
1.37 
(68) 
-0.003 
(80) 
12.70 
(92) 
3.8 
(100) 
0.313 
(80) 
3 
(90) 
-0.25 
(80) 
10 
South Africa 0.032 
(269) 
0.309 
(239) 
-0.002 
(269) 
14.90 
(272) 
3.3 
(290) 
0.264 
(232) 
8 
(261) 
0.10 
(232) 
29 
Tanzania 0.020 
(147) 
0.223 
(131) 
-0.004 
(147) 
12.21 
(147) 
6.7 
(160) 
0.312 
(128) 
4.9 
(144) 
-0.41 
(128) 
16 
Togo 0.017 
(55) 
0.17 
(48) 
0.001 
(55) 
12.41 
(59) 
3.5 
(70) 
0.244 
(56) 
3.7 
(63) 
-0.94 
(56) 
7 
Tunisia 0.008 
(191) 
0.12 
(166) 
0.002 
(191) 
13.74 
(191) 
3.9 
(200) 
0.250 
(160) 
4.8 
(180) 
0.13 
(180) 
20 
Uganda 0.025 
(138) 
0.338 
(117) 
-0.006 
(136) 
11.98 
(180) 
7.1 
(136) 
0.332 
(105) 
4.7 
(189) 
-0.45 
(168) 
21 
Zambia 0.034 
(108) 
0.246 
(94) 
-0.027 
(108) 
11.77 
(114) 
7.8 
(140) 
0.279 
(112) 
5.3 
(126) 
-0.51 
(112) 
14 
          
TOTAL         271 
Mean 0.019 0.265 0.003 13.51 5.74 0.322 5.23 -0.36 
 
Median  0.014 0.11 0.005 13.24 5.17 0.302 5.00 -0.39  
S.D. 0.02 1.97 0.26 1.94 3.91 0.650 1.48 0.58  
Observation  2215 1914 2213 2328 2710 2045 2439 2168  
CF = net commission and fee income to total asset ratio. EBCF = earnings before tax and commission and fee 
income to total assets. SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset. ΔCFR is change in commission and fee income 
outstanding. ΔGDP is real gross domestic product growth rate. INVPRO = minority shareholder rights 
protection. LERNER = banking competition. LEGAL = Quality of legal enforcement. Number of 
observations are reported in parenthesis 
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Table 2: Main Regression (Fixed Effect) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 0.105*** 
(4.24) 
0.103*** 
(4.35) 
0.103*** 
(4.38) 
0.105*** 
(4.17) 
0.108*** 
(4.14) 
0.101*** 
(4.22) 
0.129*** 
(4.01) 
0.133*** 
(3.95) 
ΔCFR 0.0002 
(1.27) 
0.0002 
(1.25) 
0.0002 
(1.25) 
0.0002 
(1.24) 
0.0002 
(1.28) 
0.0002 
(1.21) 
0.0002 
(1.26) 
0.0002 
(1.20) 
EBCF -0.136*** 
(-3.72) 
-
0.152*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.103* 
(-1.94) 
-
0.133*** 
(-3.58) 
-
0.130*** 
(-2.92) 
0.266** 
(2.12) 
-
0.230*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.322** 
(-2.49) 
SIZE -0.006*** 
(-3.43) 
-
0.006*** 
(-3.52) 
-
0.006*** 
(-3.58) 
-
0.006*** 
(-3.43) 
-
0.007*** 
(-3.42) 
-
0.006*** 
(-3.74) 
-
0.008*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.37) 
ΔGDP 0.00003 
(0.41) 
0.00002 
(0.30) 
0.00002 
(0.22) 
0.0001 
(0.88) 
-0.0001 
(-1.51) 
0.00007 
(0.88) 
0.00006 
(0.81) 
0.00003 
(0.42) 
POS  -0.0004 
(-0.51) 
      
NEG   0.001* 
(1.67) 
     
REC    0.001 
(1.04) 
    
BOOM     0.002** 
(2.15) 
   
INVPRO      0.001*** 
(3.22) 
  
LEGAL       -0.006 
(-1.61) 
 
LERNER        -0.005 
(-1.01) 
POS*EBCF  0.043 
(0.65) 
      
NEG*EBCF   -0.038 
(-0.57) 
     
REC*EBCF    -0.175** 
(-1.99) 
    
BOOM*EBCF     -0.011 
(-0.25) 
   
INVPRO*EBCF      -
0.070*** 
(-2.60) 
  
LEGAL*EBCF       -0.169** 
(-2.43) 
 
LERNER*EBCF        0.494 
(1.39) 
         
Adjusted  R² 76.35 76.36 76.40 76.50 76.43 77.86 81.63 81.19 
F-statistic 22.81 22.66 22.71 22.83 22.74 24.65 24.39 23.05 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation 1912 1912 1912 1912 1912 1910 1406 1365 
All estimations include robust standard errors clustered by bank and year. Bank and year fixed effects are included. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. CF = 
net commission and fee income to total asset ratio. POS = dummy variable that take the value 1 when EBCF ratio is above-
the-median EBCF ratio and zero otherwise; NEG = dummy variable that take the value 1 when EBCF is negative and zero 
otherwise. REC = dummy variable that take the value of 1 during periods of economic downturns, that is, periods with 
negative ΔGDP growth rate, and zero otherwise; BOOM = dummy variable that take the value of 1 for periods of economic 
prosperity, that is, periods with above-the-median ΔGDP growth rate, and zero otherwise. LEGAL = quality of legal systems 
across countries. INVPRO = protection of minority shareholders rights. LERNER = banking competitiveness. 
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Table 3: County-Specific (Pooled OLS) Regression 
Model: CFit = α0 + α1EBCFit + α2ΔCFRit + α3SIZEit + α4ΔGDPt + eit   
Country β0 EBCF ΔCFR SIZE ΔGDP Adj R² F-Stat 
Algeria -0.060** 
(-2.44) 
-0.293*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.54) 
0.006*** 
(3.29) 
0.0003 
(0.54) 
78.14 23.63 
Angola 0.042** 
(2.51) 
-0.009 
(-0.38) 
0.0001*** 
(4.51) 
-0.002* 
(-1.71) 
0.00006 
(0.55) 
78.66 20.59 
Botswana 0.135*** 
(2.87) 
-0.016 
(-0.63) 
0.0005 
(1.24) 
-0.009** 
(-2.54) 
-0.0002 
(-1.14) 
79.98 23.11 
 
Cameroun 0.159*** 
(4.44) 
-0.547** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0009 
(-1.41) 
-0.012*** 
(-4.14) 
0.005*** 
(3.97) 
88.34 26.25 
Egypt 0.331*** 
(4.02) 
-0.042 
(-0.23) 
0.005 
(0.57) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.0004 
(-0.91) 
59.71 11.69 
 
Ethiopia -0.085*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.343*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.54) 
0.007*** 
(3.98) 
0.0009** 
(1.96) 
66.70 11.94 
Ghana 0.028 
(0.99) 
-0.045* 
(-1.84) 
0.004 
(1.17) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
0.00002 
(0.08) 
22.29 2.48 
Kenya 0.047*** 
(4.91) 
-0.038 
(-1.13) 
0.003** 
(2.38) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.00008 
(-0.64) 
84.56 43.21 
Mauritius 0.016 
(1.38) 
0.068* 
(1.74) 
0.0009*** 
(2.85) 
-0.0008 
(-0.93) 
-0.0001 
(-0.64) 
68.57 14.48 
Morocco 0.028 
(1.59) 
0.031 
(0.31) 
0.005** 
(2.40) 
-0.001 
(-1.17) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.84) 
86.65 35.47 
Nigeria 0.128*** 
(3.52) 
-0.043** 
(-1.97) 
0.002 
(1.27) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0005 
(-1.02) 
98.56 137.4 
Senegal -0.021 
(-0.92) 
-0.146** 
(-2.47) 
-0.0001 
(-0.87) 
0.003* 
(1.71) 
-0.0002 
(-0.33) 
71.61 14.00 
South Africa 0.382*** 
(5.42) 
-0.423*** 
(-3.75) 
0.0009 
(0.66) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.09) 
0.0004 
(0.91) 
85.34 44.40 
Tanzania 0.034** 
(1.90) 
-0.119*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.00001* 
(-1.88) 
-0.001 
(-0.97) 
0.0005 
(1.19) 
81.17 30.49 
Togo 0.036*** 
(3.87) 
0.002 
(1.60) 
0.006 
(0.43) 
-0.001* 
(-1.67) 
-0.0001*** 
(-2.77) 
84.52 26.66 
Tunisia -0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.011 
(-0.88) 
0.0009** 
(2.37) 
0.0007 
(0.91) 
0.00002 
(0.29) 
80.33 30.29 
Uganda 0.066 
(1.07) 
0.015 
(0.33) 
-0.0008 
(-0.68) 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
0.0001 
(0.37) 
71.51 12.92 
Zambia 0.239*** 
(3.64) 
-0.061 
(-0.40) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.92) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.002** 
(-2.32) 
59.25 8.95 
Note: robust standard error correction is applied. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity Test  
 Forward-looking Discretion 
(Arellano-Bond GMM) 
Pre-and Post 
Financial Crisis 
Listed vs 
Unlisted 
without South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C   0.037*** 
(11.81) 
0.043*** 
(12.07) 
0.069*** 
(4.21) 
CFt-1 0.754** 
(2.43) 
0.759** 
(15.59) 
   
CFt-2  0.033 
(0.99) 
   
ΔCFR   0.00002 
(0.53) 
0.0002 
(0.61) 
0.0001 
(1.06) 
ΔCFRt-1 0.001 
(0.47) 
0.002** 
(2.55) 
   
EBCF -0.040 
(-0.16) 
-0.056 
(-1.16) 
-0.266*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.213*** 
(-6.47) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.24) 
SIZE   -0.001*** 
(-7.16) 
-0.002*** 
(-8.04) 
-0.004*** 
(-3.20) 
SIZEt-1 0.001 
(0.06) 
0.006 
(0.80) 
   
ΔGDP 0.0007 
(0.49) 
0.0007*** 
(2.80) 
0.0001 
(1.25) 
0.0001 
(1.26) 
0.00009 
(1.29) 
LISTED    0.008*** 
(4.25) 
 
LISTED*EBCF    -0.006 
(-0.06) 
 
CRISIS   0.0009 
(0.67) 
  
CRISIS*EBCF   0.077 
(0.84) 
  
      
Sarjan (J) test 27.81 25.24    
Hansen p-value 0.63 0.66    
No of instrument 44 44    
AR(1) 0.000 0.000    
AR(2) 0.378 0.448    
      
Adjusted R²   13.39 15.78 74.34 
F-statistic   54.26 63.13 20.08 
Observation 1638 1365 1990 1990 1673 
Column 1-4 is estimated with Arellano-Bond GMM estimation and includes robust standard errors clustered by 
bank and year (Petersen, 2009). The Hansen J statistic test the adequacy of GMM instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) 
test for the presence of first order and second order serial correlation. Column 5 and 6 is estimated using pooled 
OLS because of the presence of time invariant variables. Column 7 is estimated with fixed effect OLS and 
excludes bank samples from South Africa. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. CFt-1 = one-year lagged commission and fee income to total 
asset ratio for bank i at year t-1. CFt-2 = two-year lagged commission and fee income to total asset ratio for bank 
i at year t-2. SIZEt-1 = one-year lagged natural logarithm of total asset. ΔCFRt-1 = lagged change in the absolute 
value of net commission and fee income for bank i at year t-1. SIZEt-1 = natural logarithm of total asset for firm i 
at year t-1. LISTED = dummy variable that take the value 1 if the African bank is listed and zero otherwise. 
CRISIS = dummy variable that take the value 1 during the period 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013; and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 5: Definition of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
CF  Net commission and fee income divided by total asset Bankscope 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total asset Bankscope 
ΔCFR Change in net commission and fee income outstanding  
EBCF Earnings before net commission and fee income  
(Profit before tax minus net commission and fee income) 
divided by total asset 
Bankscope 
ΔGDP Real gross domestic product growth rate World Economic forum 
archived in Worldbank 
database 
LEGAL Rule of law index measures the quality of the legal system 
across countries. 
Kaufmann, World 
Governance indicator 
INVPRO Investor protection variable that measure the extent of 
protection of minority shareholder rights. 
 
La Porta from Doing 
Busienss Project archived 
in Worldbank Database 
LERNER Cross-county banking competitiveness Bankscope archived in 
Worldbank Database 
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Appendix 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Correlation Matrix (with P-values in Parentheses) 
         
         Variables CF ΔCFR EBCF SIZE ΔGDP INVPRO LEGAL LERNER 
CF 1.000        
         
         
ΔCFR 0.039 1.000       
 0.144        
         
EBCF -0.376*** -0.018 1.000      
 0.000 0.484 -----      
         
SIZE -0.173*** -0.037 0.135*** 1.000     
 0.000 0.164 0.000      
         
ΔGDP -0.004 0.058** 0.085*** -0.179*** 1.000    
 0.886 0.030 0.002 0.000     
         
INVPRO 0.207*** -0.012 -0.044 0.123*** -0.192*** 1.000   
 0.000 0.656 0.105 0.000 0.000 -----   
         
LEGAL -0.062** -0.029 0.035 0.154*** - 0.164*** 0.425*** 1.000  
 0.023 0.282 0.191 0.000 0.000 0.000 -----  
         
LERNER -0.074*** 0.064** 0.071*** -0.026 0.034 0.072*** -0.143*** 1.000 
 0.006 0.019 0.008 0.333 0.207 0.008 0.000  
         
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
